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SUMMARY
Although the end of the cold war  freed
India-U.S. relations from the constraints of
global bipolarity, New Delhi-Washington
relations continued for a decade to be affected
by the burden of history, most notably the
longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry.  Recent
years, however, have witnessed a sea change
in bilateral relations, with more positive inter-
actions becoming the norm.  India’s swift
offer of full support for U.S.-led anti-terrorism
operations after the September 2001 attacks
on the United States is widely viewed as
reflective of such change. 
Continuing U.S. concern in South Asia
focuses especially on the historic and ongoing
tensions between nuclear-armed India and
Pakistan, tensions rooted in unfinished busi-
ness from the 1947 Partition, and competing
claims to the former princely state of Kashmir.
The United States also seeks to prevent the
regional proliferation of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles.  Both India and Pakistan
have so far resisted U.S. and international
pressure to sign the major international
nonproliferation treaties. 
In May 1998, India conducted a series of
unannounced nuclear tests that evoked inter-
national condemnation.  Pakistan reported
conducting its own nuclear tests less than
three weeks later.  As a result of these tests,
President Clinton imposed wide-ranging
sanctions on both countries, as mandated
under the Arms Export Control Act.  Many of
these sanctions gradually were lifted through
Congress-Executive branch cooperation from
1998 to 2000.  The remaining nuclear sanc-
tions on India and Pakistan were removed by
President Bush on September 22, 2001.
Congress also has been concerned with
human rights issues related to regional dissi-
dence and separatist movements in Kashmir,
Punjab, and India’s Northeast region.  Strife in
these areas has resulted in the deaths of tens of
thousands of civilians, militants, and security
forces over the two past decades.
Communalism has also been a matter of
concern, with spring 2002 rioting in the
Gujarat state resulting in more than 2,000,
mostly Muslim, deaths.  International human
rights groups, as well as Congress and the
U.S. State Department, have criticized India
for perceived human rights abuses by its
security forces in these regions. 
The United States has been supportive of
India’s efforts to transform its formerly
quasi-socialist economy through fiscal reform
and market opening.  Beginning in 1991, India
has been taking steps to reduce inflation and
the budget deficit, privatize state-owned
industries, reduce tariffs and industrial licens-
ing controls, and institute incentives to attract
foreign trade and investment.  Successive
coalition governments have kept India on a
general path of economic reform and market
opening, though there continues to be U.S.
concern that such movement has been slow
and inconsistent. 
The current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-
led coalition government is headed by Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.  The coalition
has been in power since October 1999 na-
tional elections decisively ended the historic
dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress
Party.  The BJP has close ties to Hindu-
nationalist parties and organizations in India
and national elections in 2004 could pit these
increasingly influential groups against those
who wish to retain India’s secular traditions.
For further reading, see CRS Reports
RL31644, U.S.-India Security Relations, and




An April thaw in Pakistan-India relations began with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
rhetorical extension of a “hand of friendship” to Pakistan, then peaked with an April 28
telephone conversation between the two countries’ prime ministers and the announced
restoration of full diplomatic ties.  U.S. Secretary of State Powell called “very, very
promising” recent signs that India and Pakistan are prepared to engage in a dialogue aimed
at resolving outstanding issues, and the White House called this “a moment of great hope.”
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rocca
visited the region in May in an effort to assist with further easing tensions and fostering
bilateral dialogue.  Also in May, Indian National Security Advisor Mishra is expected to
meet with senior U.S. officials in Washington to discuss South Asian security and
nuclearization.
Separatist leaders in Indian Kashmir expressed wariness at signs of improved New
Delhi-Islamabad relations.  The chairman of the Hurriyat Conference declined an April offer
to confer with New Delhi’s interlocutor for Kashmir, and a senior leader and former Hurriyat
chairman accused Pakistani leaders of setting the Kashmir issue in “cold storage” for the sake
better relations with India.  Hindu-nationalist leaders in India — including some members
of the national coalition government — expressed strong opposition to the Vajpayee peace
initiative.  Several analysts offer that progress on expanding India-Pakistan economic ties
will be a key test of Islamabad’s sincerity in talks that may commence in June.
Concurrent with improved relations between India and Pakistan — and perhaps in
response — separatist violence in Kashmir continued unabated, with at least 69 deaths in the
disputed region during the first week of May alone.  Although militant infiltration across the
Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC) appears to have been static during April, New Delhi blamed
Pakistan-based Islamic militant groups for lethal attacks on Indian territory in March.  Indian
intelligence reports claim that more than 4,000 militants are encamped in Pakistan-held
Kashmir and that 1,200-1,400 are poised to cross the LOC when weather permits. 
For more information, see Chronology, below.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Context of the Relationship
U.S. and Congressional Interest
In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the
immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation and the
use of India’s bases for counterterrorism operations.  The offer reflected the sea change that
has occurred in recent years in the U.S.-India relationship, which for decades was mired in
the politics of the Cold War.  The marked improvement of relations that began in the latter
months of the Clinton Administration was accelerated after a November 2001 meeting
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between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee at the White House, when the
two leaders agreed to greatly expand U.S.-India cooperation on a wide range of issues,
including counterterrorism, regional security, space and scientific collaboration, civilian
nuclear safety, and broadened economic ties.  Notable progress has come in the area of
security cooperation, with an increasingly strong focus on counterterrorism, joint military
exercises, and arms sales.  In December 2001, the U.S. Defense Policy Group met in New
Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership
based on regular and high-level policy dialogue.  In July 2002, the fifth and most recent
meeting of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was held in
Washington.
U.S. and congressional interests in India cover a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from
the militarized dispute with Pakistan and weapons proliferation to concerns about human
rights and trade and investment opportunities.  In the 1990s, India-U.S. relations were
particularly affected by the demise of the Soviet Union — India’s main trading partner and
most reliable source of economic assistance and  military equipment — and New Delhi’s
resulting need to diversify its international relationships; India’s adoption of sweeping
economic policy reforms, beginning in 1991; and a deepening bitterness between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir, along with India’s preoccupation with China as a potential long-term
strategic threat. 
With the fading of cold war constraints, the United States and India began exploring the
possibilities for a more normalized relationship between the world’s two largest democracies.
A visit to the United States by Indian PM Narasimha Rao in 1994 marked the onset of
significantly improved U.S.-India relations.  Rao addressed a joint session of Congress and
met with President Clinton.  Although discussions were held on nuclear nonproliferation,
human rights, and other issues, the main focus of the visit was rapidly expanding U.S.-India
economic relations.  Throughout the 1990s, however, regional rivalries, separatist tendencies,
and sectarian tensions continued to divert India’s attention and resources from economic and
social development.  Fallout from these unresolved problems — particularly nuclear
proliferation and human rights issues — presented serious irritants in bilateral relations.
President Clinton’s 2000 visit to South Asia seemed a major U.S. initiative to improve
cooperation with India in the areas of economic ties, regional stability, nuclear proliferation
concerns, security and counterterrorism, environmental protection, clean energy production,
and disease control.  President Clinton and Indian PM Vajpayee agreed  to institutionalize
dialogue between the two countries through a range of high-level exchanges, and the two
countries established working groups and agreements on numerous issues of mutual concern,
from increasing bilateral trade to combating global warming.  President Clinton also lifted
sanctions on some small U.S. assistance programs.
During his subsequent visit to the United States later in 2000, Vajpayee addressed a
joint session of Congress and was received for a state dinner at the White House.  On
September 15, 2000, President Clinton and Vajpayee signed a joint statement agreeing to
cooperate on arms control, terrorism, and AIDS.  During the Bush Administration, high-level
visits have continued:  Vajpayee again visited the United States in  November 2001; Home
Minister Advani and Defense Minister Fernandes in January 2002; and Foreign Minister
Sinha in September 2002.  The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, along with other top
U.S. officials, made visits to New Delhi in 2002.
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Regional Rivalries with Pakistan and China  
Three wars — in1947-48, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of military
preparedness on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry
between India and Pakistan.  The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India in 1947
and the continuing dispute over Kashmir remain major sources of interstate tension and
violence.  Despite the existence of widespread poverty across South Asia, both India and
Pakistan have built large defense establishments — including nuclear weapons capability and
ballistic missile programs — at the cost of economic and social development.  
The Kashmir problem is itself rooted in claims by both countries to the former princely
state, now divided by a military Line of Control (LOC) into the Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir.  India blames Pakistan for supporting
“cross-border terrorism” and a separatist rebellion in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley
that has claimed at least 38,000 and perhaps as many as 80,000 lives since 1989.  Pakistan
admits only to lending moral and political support to what it calls “freedom fighters”
operating mostly in and near the valley region around the city of Srinagar.  Normal relations
between New Delhi and Islamabad were severed in December 2001 after a terrorist attack
on the Indian Parliament was blamed on Pakistan-supported Islamic militants.  Other lethal
attacks on Indian civilians have been blamed on Pakistan-sponsored groups.  In October
2002, the two countries ended a tense, 10-month military standoff at their shared border, but
there was no high-level diplomatic dialogue between India and Pakistan until April 2003, a
full 21 months after a July 2001 summit meeting in the city of Agra failed to produce any
movement toward a settlement of the bilateral dispute.
India and China fought a brief but intense border war in 1962, and China has since
occupied a large swath of territory still claimed by India.  Although Sino-Indian relations
have warmed in recent years, the two countries have yet to reach a final boundary agreement.
During the last visit to China by an Indian leader in September 1993, then-Indian Prime
Minister Rao signed an agreement to reduce troops and maintain peace along the line of
actual control (LAC) that divides the two countries’ forces (along with pacts on trade,
environmental, and cultural cooperation).  Periodic working group meetings aimed at
reaching a final settlement continue; the 14th of these was held in November 2002.  In
January 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji became the first Chinese premier to visit India
in 11 years.  The Indian Prime Minister is slated to visit Beijing in 2003. 
Adding to New Delhi’s sense of insecurity are suspicions regarding China’s long-term
nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South Asia.  In fact, a strategic
orientation focused on China reportedly has affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s
own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.  Beijing’s military and economic
support for Pakistan — support that is widely believed to have included WMD-related
transfers — is a major and ongoing source of friction; expressed Chinese support for
Pakistan’s Kashmir position adds to the discomfort of Indian leaders.  New Delhi also has
taken note of Beijing’s security relations with neighboring Burma and the construction of
military facilities on the Indian Ocean.  Despite these issues, high-level exchanges between
New Delhi and Beijing regularly include statements from officials on both sides that there




National Elections and Prospects for Political Stability.  India’s most recent
national elections in October 1999 brought to power a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led
coalition government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee.  This outcome decisively ended the
historic dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi-led Congress Party, which now sits in opposition
at the national level (though its members lead numerous state governments).  This is
Vajpayee’s third tenure as Prime Minister (his previous governments lasted 13 days in 1996
and 13 months in 1998-99).
As a nation-state, India presents a vast mosaic of hundreds of different ethnic groups,
religious sects, and social castes (there are 18 official languages).  Until the last decade or
so, many of these groups found representation within the diversity of the Congress Party,
which ruled India for 45 of its 55 years since independence in 1947.  Factors in the decline
of support for the Congress included neglect of its grassroots political organizations by the
leadership, a perceived lack of responsiveness to such major constituent groups as Muslims
and lower castes, the rise of regional parties and  issue-based parties such as the BJP, and
allegations of widespread corruption involving a number of party leaders.  At the same time,
there has been a shift in power from upper caste Indians to the far more numerous lower
caste Indians, many of whom have switched their allegiance from Congress and smaller
national parties to oftentimes influential regional and caste-based parties. 
December 2002 elections in the state of Gujarat were viewed by many as a key gauge
of continued public support for the BJP.  Gujarat was the site of horrific communal conflict
earlier in 2002 when the torching of a train car filled with pro-Hindu activists killed 58 in
Ghodra and led to widespread rioting that killed more than 2,000, mostly Muslims, along
with the displacement of many thousands more.  Gujarat Chief Minister and BJP leader
Narendra Modi called for early elections — in an effort to take advantage of the polarized
political setting, some say — and ran a campaign that emphasized a perceived
Islamic/Pakistani threat to the country’s and state’s Hindu majority.  The BJP party was
rewarded with an unexpectedly decisive victory over the rival Congress Party.  
Many analysts predicted that the success in Gujarat of a strongly Hindu-nationalist
political platform would be translated into similarly strident tacks elsewhere in India, along
with a more hardline stance from the BJP-led coalition at the national level.  The next
national elections are scheduled to be held some time in 2004, but 9 state elections take place
in 2003.  State elections in February 2003 included a surprisingly strong win for the Congress
Party in Himachal Pradesh, a populous and overwhelmingly Hindu northern state where a
BJP chief minister was incumbent.  This outcome has dampened expectations that Hindu
nationalism will determine the future course of India’s national politics.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  Riding a crest of rising Hindu nationalism, the
BJP increased its strength in Parliament from only two seats in 1984 to 119 seats in 1991 to
181 seats at present.  In 1992-93, the party’s image was tarnished by its alleged complicity
in serious outbreaks of communal violence in which a mosque was destroyed at Ayodha and
2,500 people were killed in anti-Muslim rioting in Bombay and elsewhere.  Some observers
hold elements of the BJP as the political arm of the extremist Hindu nationalist organization
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS or National Volunteer Force), allegedly responsible for
the incidents.  Since then, the BJP has worked — with only limited success — to change its
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image from right-wing Hindu fundamentalist to conservative, secular, and moderate,
although February/March 2002 riots in Gujarat again damaged the party’s national and
international credentials as a secular and moderate organization. 
Following the March 1998 elections, the BJP managed to cobble together a fragile, 13-
member National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, headed by Vajpayee, and survive
a confidence vote.  Factors that kept the BJP government in power for a year included
Vajpayee’s widespread personal popularity, early popular euphoria over India’s May 1998
nuclear tests, and widespread disenchantment with previous Congress-led governments.
Vajpayee soon found himself caught in a continuing round of internal bickering and favor-
seeking by coalition members.  Such distractions delayed  efforts at focusing on more urgent
matters, including the economy.  An April 1999 no-confidence vote was precipitated by the
withdrawal of support for the BJP government by its largest coalition partner, a regional
party based in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.
The BJP advocates “Hindutva,” or an India based on Hindu culture.  Although the BJP
claims to accept all forms of belief and worship, it views Hindutva as key to nation-building.
Popular among upper caste groups, the party continues to be looked upon with suspicion by
lower caste Indians, India’s 140 million Muslims, and non-Hindi-speaking Hindus in
southern India, who together comprise a majority of India’s voters.  The more controversial
long-term goals of the BJP reportedly include building a Hindu temple on the site of a 16th
century mosque in Ayodhya that was destroyed by Hindu mobs in 1992, establishing a
uniform code of law that would abolish special status for Muslims, and abolishing the special
status granted to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.  None
of these stands are taken by the NDA 1999 election manifesto and likely would be opposed
by many NDA coalition members.  The BJP leadership has sought to put these goals on the
back-burner, but current tensions — continuing conflict between India and Pakistan and a
flare-up of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in the western state of Gujarat — have put the
party in an awkward position. 
The Congress Party.  The post-election weakness of the opposition is seen as a
major factor in the BJP coalition government’s hopes for completing its 5-year term.  With
just 110 parliamentary seats, the Congress Party today is at its lowest national representation
ever.  Observers attribute the party’s poor showing to a number of factors, including the
perception that current party leader Sonia Gandhi lacked the experience to lead the country,
the failure of Congress to make strong pre-election alliances (as had the BJP), and the
splintering of Congress in Maharashtra state. 
Support for the Congress Party began to decline following the 1984 assassination of
then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the 1991 assassination of her son, then-Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi.  Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv’s widow, refused to be drawn into active
politics until the 1998 elections.  She has since made efforts to revitalize the organization by
phasing out older leaders and attracting more women and lower castes.  In November 1998,
signs of a resurgent Congress Party were apparent in a series of state elections.  By landslide
margins, the Congress defeated BJP governments in Rajasthan and Delhi, and maintained
its control of Madhya Pradesh.  However, the inability of the Congress to form a new
government after the fall of the BJP coalition in April 1999, along with defections led by
Maharashtran politicians, weakened the party in the parliamentary elections.  October 2002
elections in Jammu and Kashmir saw the Congress Party successfully oust the BJP-allied
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National Conference to form a coalition government with the regional People’s Democratic
Party.  December 2002 elections in Gujarat were a major defeat for Congress and marked a
failure of the “soft Hindutva” position taken by Gujarati party members in an effort to erode
BJP support in the state, Congress was again buoyed by an upset win over BJP incumbents
in Himachal Pradesh in February 2003.
India-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Security Issues
Dispute Over Kashmir.  Although India suffers from several militant regional
separatist movements, the Kashmir dispute has proven the most lethal and intractable, and
the interest of neighboring Pakistan is acute.  The problem is rooted in claims by both India
and Pakistan to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military Line of Control
(LOC) separating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad
(Free) Kashmir.  Spurred by what were perceived as being rigged state elections that unfairly
favored pro-New Delhi candidates in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between Islamic
militants and their supporters and Indian security forces in the Indian-held Kashmir Valley
has claimed up to 80,000 lives.  India blames Pakistan for fomenting the rebellion, as well
as supplying arms, training, and fighters.  It insists that the dispute should not be
“internationalized” through the involvement of third-party mediators.  Pakistan, for its part,
claims only to provide diplomatic and moral support to what it calls “freedom fighters” who
resist Indian rule.  Islamabad has long sought to bring external major power persuasion to
bear on India, especially from the United States.  The longstanding U.S. position on Kashmir
is that the whole of the former princely state is disputed territory, and that the issue must be
resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan while taking into account the
wishes of the Kashmiri people.
A series of kidnapings and general strikes in the Kashmir Valley, beginning after the
controversial elections of 1989, led India to impose rule by the central government  in 1990
and to send in troops to establish order.  Many Kashmiris were moved to support newly
established militant separatist groups after several incidents in which Indian troops fired on
demonstrators.  Some  groups, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),
continue to seek an independent or autonomous Kashmir.  Other local groups, including the
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), seek union with Pakistan. In 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat
(Freedom) Conference was formed as an umbrella organization for groups opposed to Indian
rule in Kashmir.  The Hurriyat membership of some 23 political and religious groups
includes the JKLF (now a political group) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the political wing of the
HM).  The Hurriyat Conference, which states that it is committed to seeking dialogue with
the Indian government on a broad range of issues, seeks a tripartite conference on Kashmir,
including India, Pakistan, and representatives of the Kashmiri people.  Hurriyat leaders also
have demanded Kashmiri representation at any talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir.
In 1995, the government of then-PM Rao began efforts to restart the political process
in Kashmir.  May 1996 elections were held to fill Jammu and Kashmir’s six parliamentary
seats.  Voter turnout in the state was about 40%, with some reports of voters being herded
to polling stations by security forces.  The elections served as a rehearsal for state assembly
elections, which were held in September 1996.  The National Conference (NC), the
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longstanding establishment Kashmiri party led by Farooq Abdullah, won 57 of 87 seats, and
Abdullah became chief minister of the state.  In April 1998, Jammu and Kashmir again took
part in national parliamentary elections.  Pre-election violence and a boycott by the Hurriyat
kept voter turnout in the state at an estimated 35%-40%.  Voter turnout in the state declined
even further in 1999 parliamentary elections.
In 2001 and 2002, a series of violent incidents worsened the region’s security climate
and brought India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war.  In October 2001, Islamic
militants attacked the state assembly building in Srinagar, killing 38.  In December 2001, a
brazen attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi left 14 dead, including the five
attackers.  Indian government officials blamed Pakistan-based militant groups for both
attacks and initiated a massive military mobilization that brought hundreds of thousands of
Indian troops to the border with Pakistan.  In May 2002, in the midst of this armed
showdown, militants attacked an Indian army base in the Jammu town of Kaluchak, leaving
34 dead, many of them women and children.  New Delhi leveled accusations that Islamabad
was sponsoring Kashmiri terrorism; Indian leaders talked of making “pre-emptive” military
incursions against separatists’ training bases on Pakistani territory.   The situation was further
exacerbated with the assassinations of two moderate Kashmiri separatist leaders in late-2002
and early-2003.  (For a review, see CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists.)
International pressure included numerous visits to the region by top U.S. diplomats and
led Pakistani President Musharraf to publically state that no infiltration was taking place at
the LOC.  On receiving assurances from Secretary of State Powell and others that Pakistan
would terminate support for infiltration and dismantle militant training camps, India began
the slow process of reducing tensions with Pakistan.  In October 2002, after completion of
state elections in Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi announced that a months-long process of
redeploying troops to their peacetime barracks had begun.  Islamabad responded with a
stand-down order of its own, although the Indian and Pakistani armies continue to exchange
sporadic small arms, mortar, and even artillery fire along the LOC.
Indian Kashmir remains volatile.  October 2002 elections to the state assembly resulted
in the ouster of the National Conference and the establishment of a coalition government of
the Congress Party and the People’s Democratic Party.  While the seating of this new and
seemingly more moderate state government renewed hopes for peace in the troubled region,
continued and deadly separatist violence has dampened early optimism.  The United States
welcomed the election process as a necessary first step toward the initiation of a meaningful
dialogue between India and Pakistan to peacefully resolve their dispute.  Secretary of State
Powell has asserted that, “We are looking to both India and Pakistan to take steps that begin
to bring peace to the region and to ensure a better future for the Kashmiri people. The
problems with Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only through a healthy
political process and a vibrant dialogue” (see CRS Report RS21300, Elections in Kashmir).
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation.  U.S. policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
for the future use of nuclear weapons.  In May 1998, India conducted five underground
nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing.  Despite U.S. and
world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed.  The tests created a global storm of
criticism, and represented a serious setback for two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
efforts in South Asia.  Following the  tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on
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non-humanitarian economic and military aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under
Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  Almost immediately, Congress
moved to ease restrictions in some areas, notably with wheat sales.  In September 2001,
President Bush waived the remaining sanctions on India pursuant to P.L. 106-79.
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking to
achieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a
conventionally stronger India.  India began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, after its
1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s first nuclear test in 1964.
Pakistan’s nuclear program was prompted by India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’s
defeat by India in the 1971 war and consequent loss of East Pakistan, now independent
Bangladesh.  India currently is believed to have enough fissile material for 75-100 nuclear
weapons; Pakistan is thought to have approximately half that number.  Both countries have
aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs.  India’s military has inducted short- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, while Pakistan itself possesses short- and medium-
range missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea).  All are assumed to be
capable of delivering small nuclear warheads over significant distances.
In August 1999, a quasi-governmental Indian body released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine
for India calling for a “minimum credible deterrent” (MCD) based upon a triad of delivery
systems and pledging that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.  The
document has been neither accepted nor rejected by New Delhi.  (Islamabad has made no
comparable public declaration, but it also seeks to maintain an MCD while rejecting a no-
first-use pledge.)  In April 2002, the Indian Cabinet approved the establishment of a Strategic
Nuclear Command (SNC) that would control the country’s nuclear arsenal, and four months
later the Indian Defense Minister stated that “a nuclear doctrine is in place” and a command
and control structure is being developed.   In January 2003, New Delhi announced creation
of a Nuclear Command Authority.  In creating such an body, India appears to be taking the
next step toward operationalizing its nuclear weapons capability.  (Pakistan created its own
Nuclear Command Authority in 2000.)  (For details, see CRS Report RS21237, India and
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Status and CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic
Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan.)
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts.  During the 1990s, the United States security focus
in South Asia sought to minimize damage to the nonproliferation regime, prevent escalation
of an arms and/or missile race, and promote Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue.  In light of
these goals, the Clinton Administration set forward five key “benchmarks” for India and
Pakistan based on the contents of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 (June 1998) which
condemned the two countries’ nuclear tests.  These were: 1) signing and ratifying the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 2) halting all further production of fissile
material and participating in Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations; 3) limiting
development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery vehicles; 4)
implementing strict export controls on sensitive WMD materials and technologies; and 5)
establishing bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve their mutual differences.
Progress in each of these areas has been limited, and the Bush Administration no longer
refers to the benchmark framework.  Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT, and
both appear to be continuing their production of weapons-grade fissile materials.  (India has
consistently rejected this treaty, as well as the NPT, as discriminatory, calling instead for a
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global nuclear disarmament regime.  Although both India and Pakistan currently observe
self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing, they continue to resist signing the CTBT — a
position made more tenable by U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999.)  The status of
weaponization and deployment is unclear, though there are indications that this is occurring
at a slow, but more or less steady pace.  Aside from security concerns, the governments of
both countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs and the
domestic unpopularity of relinquishing what are perceived to be potent symbols of national
power.  Early optimism in the area of export controls has waned somewhat as fears that these
countries, especially Pakistan, might seek to export WMD materials and/or technologies have
gained some credence.  Finally, although there has been no repeat of the intense military
clashes of May-June 1999, and a recent ten-month-long military standoff has eased, tensions
in Kashmir remain high, and bilateral dialogue is not occurring.  Some observers have lately
called for a new U.S. approach that would provide technical assistance in enhancing the
security of any WMD materials in South Asia (see CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat
Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan).
Congressional Action.  Through a series of legislative measures, Congress has lifted
nuclear-related sanctions both on India and Pakistan.  In October 1999, Congress passed
H.R.2561, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, and it was signed by the
President as P.L.106-79 on October 29.  Title IX of the act gives the President authority to
waive sanctions applied against India and Pakistan in response to the nuclear tests.  In a
presidential determination on India and Pakistan issued on October 27, 1999, the President
waived economic sanctions on India.  On September 22, 2001, President Bush issued a final
determination removing remaining sanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998
nuclear tests.  Currently, the last effects of the nuclear sanctions are four Indian entities (and
their subsidiaries) that remain on the Department of Commerce list of entities for which
export licenses are required. (For details, see CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan:
Current U.S. Economic Sanctions.)  Title XVI, Section 1601 of P.L.107-228 outlines
nonproliferation objectives to be achieved in South Asia with respect to nuclear testing,
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile deployments and developments, export controls and
confidence-building measures.  Among the numerous concerns voiced by Members of
Congress in March 2003 was that there continue to be “contradictions” in U.S.
nonproliferation policy toward South Asia.
U.S.-India Security Cooperation.  Unlike U.S.-Pakistan military ties, which date
back to the 1950s, security cooperation between the United States and India is in the early
stages of development.  Since September 2001, and despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement
with Pakistan, India-U.S. security cooperation has flourished.  Both countries have
acknowledged a desire for greater bilateral security cooperation and a series of measures
have been taken to achieve this.  The India-U.S. Defense Policy Group — moribund since
India’s 1998 nuclear tests and ensuing U.S. sanctions — was revived in late 2001.   Joint
Executive Steering Groups between the U.S. and Indian armed services hold regular
meetings.  During 2002 and into 2003, the United States and India held numerous joint
exercises involving all military branches.  Unprecedented advanced air combat exercises
reportedly are planned for 2003.  Despite these developments, there remain indications that
the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian military leaders are divergent on
several key issues, including India’s role in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, approaches
to countering terrorism, and a potential U.S. role in resolving the India-Pakistan dispute.
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Moreover, the existence of a nonproliferation constituency in the United States is seen as a
further hindrance to more fully developed military-to-military relations. 
Along with increasingly visible military ties, the issue of U.S. arms sales to India has
taken a higher profile.  In February 2002, Congress was notified of the negotiated sale to
India of 8 counter-battery radar sets (or “Firefinder” weapon locating radars) valued at more
than $100 million (the following September, arrangements were made for the sale of four
additional sets).  The Indian government reportedly possesses an extensive “wish-list” of
desired U.S.-made weapons, including P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot anti-missile
systems, and electronic warfare systems.  The United States appears prepared to provide
Indian security forces with sophisticated electronic ground sensors that may help stem the
tide of militant infiltration in the Kashmir region.  U.S. Ambassador Blackwill stated in
November 2002 that “the Pentagon is expeditiously processing the Indian army’s request for
significant Special Forces equipment and border sensors.”  Still, some in India consider the
United States to be a “fickle” partner that may not always be relied upon to provide the kinds
of reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by New Delhi.
In a controversial turn, the Indian government reportedly is seeking to purchase a
sophisticated missile-defense system — the Arrow Weapon System — from Israel.
However, because the United States took the lead in the system’s development, the U.S.
government has veto power over any Israeli exports of the Arrow.  Although numerous U.S.
Defense Department officials are seen to support the sale as meshing with President Bush’s
policy of cooperating with friendly countries on missile defense, State Department officials
are reported to opposed the transfer, believing that it would send the wrong signal to other
weapons-exporting states at a time when the U.S. is seeking to discourage weapons
proliferation in the international system.
Joint India-U.S. military exercises, arms sales negotiations, and an FY2003 budget
allocation of $5 million in U.S. Foreign Military Financing for India have caused disquiet in
Pakistan, where there is concern that these developments will strengthen India’s position
through an appearance that the United States is siding with India.  Islamabad is concerned
that its already disadvantageous conventional military status vis-a-vis New Delhi will be
further eroded by India’s acquisition of additional modern weapons platforms.  In fact,
numerous observers have noted what appears to be a pro-India drift in the U.S. government’s
strategic orientation in South Asia, along with signs that the United States has been frustrated
by the continued flow of separatist militants across the Kashmiri Line of Control and into
Indian Kashmir (despite numerous promises by the Pakistani government that such
movements would cease).  At the same time, the United States regularly lauds Pakistan’s
participation as a key ally in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition.  (For a detailed
discussion, see CRS Report RL31644, U.S.-India Security Relations.)
Regional Dissidence and Human Rights
A vastly diverse country in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, and religion, India can
be difficult to govern.  Internal instability resulting from diversity is further complicated by
colonial legacies — for example, international borders separate members of the same ethnic
groups, creating flashpoints for regional dissidence and separatism.  Kashmir and Assam are
two regions that continue to suffer from violent separatist campaigns; Punjab saw significant
struggle in the 1980s.  The remote and underdeveloped northeast of India is populated by a
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complex mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, both tribal and non-tribal.  Migration of non-
tribal peoples into less populated tribal areas is at the root of many problems in that region.
India-Bangladesh relations have been disrupted in recent months by New Delhi’s accusations
that Dhaka is taking insufficient action against Pakistan-supported separatist militants who
find sanctuary on Bangladeshi territory.
Gujarat.  Gujarat is a relatively prosperous state in western India on the Arabian Sea.
In February 2002, a group of Hindu activists returning by train from the city of Ayodha —
the site of the razed 16th century Babri Mosque and the proposed Ram Janmabhoomi Temple
— were attacked by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra, Gujarat, and 58 people were
killed.  In the communal rioting that followed, more than 2,000 people were killed, most of
them Muslim.  Many observers criticized the BJP-led state and national governments for
inaction; some even saw evidence of state government complicity in anti-Muslim attacks.
Leading human rights groups have been harshly critical of the central government’s alleged
inaction in bringing those responsible to justice.  The government’s inability to successfully
quell violence in Gujarat led to rifts within India’s BJP-led National Democratic Alliance,
with some secular coalition members condemning the BJP role.  However, in December
2002, in what many analysts see as a vindication of the BJP government in Gujarat and its
Hindu-nationalist tack, state elections there resulted in a decisive BJP victory, and Hindu-
nationalist groups are vowing to employ in other states what are seen by many to be divisive
communal tactics (although the BJP’s upset loss in Himachal Pradesh’s February 2003
elections has caused enthusiasm to wane).
The Northeast.  The Kashmir region is home to India’s most widely known separatist
movement, but other significant and lethal internal conflicts are ongoing.  Since the time of
India’s foundation, numerous separatist groups have fought for ethnic autonomy or
independence in the country’s northeast region; some of the tribal struggles are centuries old.
It is estimated that more than 25,000 people have been killed in such fighting since 1948.
The United Liberation Front of Asom, the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland, and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland are among
the groups at war with the New Delhi government (though the decades-old Naga campaign
may be ending).  In addition, the Maoist People’s War Group is continuing to wreak havoc
in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh.  Indian government officials have at times blamed
Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan for “sheltering” one or more of these groups beyond
the reach of Indian security forces, and accuse Pakistan’s intelligence agency of training and
providing them with material support.
Human Rights.  According to the U.S. State Department’s India Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2002 (issued March 2003), the Indian government “generally
respected the human rights of its citizens; however, numerous serious problems remained.”
These included extensive societal violence against women; extrajudicial killings, including
faked encounter killings; excessive use of force by security forces, arbitrary arrests, and
incommunicado detentions in Kashmir and several northeastern states; torture and rape by
agents of the government; poor prison conditions and lengthy pretrial detentions without
charge; forced prostitution; child prostitution and female infanticide; human trafficking; and
caste-based discrimination and violence, among others.  Terrorist attacks and kidnapings also
remained grievous problems, especially in Kashmir and the northeastern states.
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The U.S. State Department notes that, “Many of these abuses are generated by a
traditionally hierarchical social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country’s many
ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and the authorities’
attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods and training.”  Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups have been harshly critical of India’s
human rights record on these issues, especially with regard to sectarian violence in Gujarat
in the spring of 2002.  Also, the March 2002 enactment of a new Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA) has come under fire as providing the government a powerful tool with which to
arbitrarily target minorities and political opponents.  In one example, in February 2003, the
Gujarat government charged 131 Muslims under POTA for allegedly attacking Hindus in
Godhra one year earlier.  Although ensuing rioting caused up to 2,000 Muslim deaths, the
Hindu-nationalist BJP that heads the state government has not charged any Hindus under
POTA for violence against Muslims.  Elsewhere, a reported 5,000 Kashmiris currently are
in jail under anti-terrorist laws.  In general, India has denied international human rights
groups official access to Kashmir, Punjab, and other sensitive areas.
A secular nation, India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with occasional
lapses), which is protected under its constitution.  India’s population includes a Hindu
majority of 82% as well as a large Muslim minority of more than 130 million (14%).
Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others each total less than 3%.  Although freedom
of religion is protected by the Indian government, human rights groups have noted that
India’s religious tolerance is susceptible to attack by religious extremists.  In March 2003,
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom expressed its “deep
disappointment” at Secretary of State Powell’s decision to leave India off the “countries of
particular concern” list, saying that there is “ample evidence that [India] meets the legislative
criteria” for such designation. 
India’s Economy and U.S. Concerns
Many observers believe that India’s long-term economic potential is tremendous, and
recent strides in the technology sector have brought international attention to such high-tech
centers as Bangalore and Hyderabad.  Yet analysts — along with some U.S. government
officials — point to excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures as a hindrance to the
realization of India’s full economic potential.  Constant comparisons with the progress of the
Chinese economy show India lagging in rates of growth and foreign investment, and in the
removal of trade barriers.  After enjoying an average growth rate above 6% for the 1990s, the
Indian economy has cooled somewhat with the recent global economic downturn.  For
FY2002 (ending in March 2003), the estimated real change in GDP stands at 4.4%.  Robust
growth in the service and industrial sectors was countered by a contraction in the agricultural
sector.  Analysts believe the New Delhi government’s target of 8% growth for FY2003 is
overly optimistic, and consider a rate of 6-6.5% to be more realistic.  Inflation rates have
been fairly low (est. 4.4% in 2002), but are expected to climb somewhat in coming years as
the industrial sector grows stronger.
A major U.S. concern with regard to India is the scope and pace of reforms in what has
been that country’s quasi-socialist economy.  Economic reforms begun in 1991, under the
Congress-led government of then-Prime Minister Rao, boosted economic growth and led to
huge foreign investment to India in the mid-1990s (annual direct foreign investment rose
from about $100 million in 1990 to $2.4 billion by 1996).  More than one-third of these
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investments were made by U.S. companies.  Reform efforts stagnated, however, under the
weak coalition governments of the mid-1990s.  The Asian financial crisis, and sanctions on
India (as a result of its May 1998 nuclear tests), further dampened the economic outlook.
Following the 1999 parliamentary election, the Vajpayee government launched  second-
generation economic reforms — including major deregulation, privatization, and tariff-
reducing measures — with the goal of attracting $10 billion in annual foreign direct
investment. Once seen as favoring domestic business and diffident about foreign
involvement, the government appears to gradually be embracing globalization and has sought
to reassure foreign investors with promises of transparent and nondiscriminatory policies.
Most recently, the debate over privatization focuses on the proposed sale of India’s two large
state-owned oil companies, a sale supported by the BJP but opposed by other politically
powerful groups.  However, the budget unveiled by Indian Finance Minister Singh in
February 2003 has been criticized by analysts as doing too little to curb India’s growing fiscal
deficit or to raise the country’s low tax revenues.
As India’s largest trading and investment partner, the United States strongly supports
New Delhi’s continuing economic reform policies.  U.S. exports to India in 2002 were
valued at $4.1 billion, while imports from India in that year totaled about $11.8 billion.
Despite significant tariff reductions and other measures taken by India to improve market
access, according to the report of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) for 2002,
a number of foreign trade barriers remain and, in November 2002, then-U.S. Treasury
Secretary O’Neill noted that India’s average tariff rates are among the highest in Asia.  U.S.
exports that reportedly would benefit from lower Indian tariffs include fertilizers, wood
products, computers, medical equipment, scrap metals, and agricultural products. 
Inadequate intellectual property rights protection, by means of patents, trademarks and
copyrights, has been a long-standing issue between the United States and India.  In a
November 2002 speech in Mumbai, U.S. Under Secretary of State Larson made an explicit
link between the improvement of India’s intellectual property rights protections and India’s
further economic growth.  Major areas of irritation have included pirating of U.S.
pharmaceuticals, books, tapes, and videos.  The International Intellectual Property Alliance
estimates U.S. losses of more than $468 million due to trade piracy in 2002.  U.S. motion
picture industry representatives estimated their annual losses due to audiovisual piracy at $66
million.  In May 2003, the USTR again named India to the Special 301 Priority Watch List
for its “weak” protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
U.S. Assistance
In 1999, the population of India exceeded one billion and is projected to be larger than
that of China by 2035.  One-third of India’s people live below the poverty line — India has
more poor people than Africa and Latin America combined — and half of its children are
malnourished.  Nearly 40% of India’s urban population live in slums with no access to clean
water and sanitation services, and India has more HIV-infected people (more than 4 million)
than any other country.  The status of women is generally poor, with the already low country-
wide female literacy rate of 39% dipping below 30% in some regions and rural areas. 
The United States is the third largest bilateral aid donor to India, after Japan and Britain.
Between 1946 and 2000, the United States provided more than $13.8 billion in economic
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loans and grants to India (plus $151.6 million in military assistance, 95% of which was
distributed from 1962-1966).  Actual U.S. assistance to India in FY2002 totaled more than
$79 million (and an additional $93.7 million in P.L. 480 food assistance).  The Bush
Administration’s request for FY2003 would have increased this amount to $108 million (plus
$91.3 million in food assistance), with the most notable boosts coming through Economic
Support Funds (ESF) (from $7 million to $25 million) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
(from zero to $5 million).  However, in P.L. 108-7, Congress allocated only $10.5 million
in ESF, bringing the actual FY2003 assistance total to $93.3 million.  The Administration’s
FY2004 request currently stands at $95 million, plus another $45 million in food assistance.
The main focus of USAID programs in India are:  improving the quality of and access
to reproductive health services; providing supplementary food and health services to the
poor; fostering energy efficiency, improving environmental conditions in urban areas;
reducing transmission of infectious diseases; expanding service delivery networks for
women; improving capacity of financial markets and government to accelerate economic
growth; and reducing suffering associated with natural disasters and establishing conditions
for rehabilitation.  
Security-related assistance for India in FY2003 includes a new $5 million FMF program
to “further promote cooperation and interoperability by encouraging Indian use of U.S.
equipment.”  These funds also will be devoted to improving security along the Kashmiri Line
of Control.  The United States also provides funds for surveillance and counterterrorism
equipment, counter-narcotics, nonproliferation efforts, and military training.
CHRONOLOGY
05/08/03 — After meeting with senior Pakistani officials in Islamabad, Deputy Secretary
of State Armitage said he was “cautiously optimistic” about the renewal of
diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan.
05/07/03 — A spokesman for the Indian government described Islamabad’s response to
New Delhi’s peace overtures as being “completely inadequate,” given that
they failed to mention the issue of “cross-border terrorism.”
05/06/03 — Separatist rebels in India’s northeastern Tripura state raided two Bengali
villages near the Bangladesh border, killing 32 civilians.
05/03/03 — Six men said to have links with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba group are
arrested and charged with a March bomb attack in Delhi that killed 11.
05/02/03 — Indian PM Vajpayee told the Indian Parliament that he would make a “third
and final” bid for peace with Pakistan, and announced that India will send an
ambassador to Islamabad to renew full diplomatic ties after a 17-month
hiatus.  Pakistan made a corresponding announcement the next day.  U.S.
Secretary of State Powell called the developments “very, very promising.”
05/01/03 — The U.S. Trade Representative again named India to the Special 301 Priority
Watch List for its “weak” protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights. On the same day, Indian Environment Minister Baalu met with U.S.
EPA Administrator Whitman in Washington to further coordination of joint
environmental protection programs. 
IB93097 05-09-03
CRS-15
04/30/03 — New Delhi blamed the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba group for a March
terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 24 Hindu villagers.  On the same day,
Indian Defense Minister Fernandes said that a total of 1,874 Indian soldiers
were killed during the ten-month military standoff with Pakistan in 2002.
04/29/03 — The navies of India and Oman concluded joint exercises in the Arabian Sea.
04/28/03 — A brief telephone conversation between Pakistani PM Jamali and Indian PM
Vajpayee marked the first high-level talks between Pakistan and India in
nearly two years.  The two leaders discussed ways to “resolve outstanding
issues through dialogue,” and Jamali invited his counterpart to visit Pakistan.
04/27/03 — Indian Defense Minister Fernandes visited Beijing, where the Chinese
government expressed a desire to “upgrade” India-China ties to a “new
level,” including in the military sphere.
04/26/03 — U.S. and Indian special forces soldiers completed a three-week joint exercise
at a counterinsurgency and jungle warfare school in northeastern India.
04/22/03 — The chairman of the Kashmiri separatist Hurriyat Conference declined an
offer to confer with N.N. Vohra, New Delhi’s interlocutor for Kashmir.
04/21/03 — U.S. Ambassador to India Blackwill announced his resignation effective at
the end of August.  Ambassador Blackwill is viewed as being an ardent
supporter of closer U.S.-India ties and a vocal critic of Pakistan’s role in
Kashmir.
04/18/03 — In an historic speech in Srinagar, Kashmir, Indian PM Vajpayee extended a
“hand of friendship” to Pakistan, saying that dialogue is necessary to resolve
the Pakistan-India dispute.  Enthusiasm was dampened when subsequent
statements from New Delhi reiterated India’s position that talks cannot begin
until all “cross-border terrorism” is halted.  Also on April 18, India launched
its first indigenously-built stealth missile frigate.  
04/17/03 — U.S. State Department Director of Policy Planning Haass stated that U.S.
pressure on the Pakistani government to stop infiltration across the Kashmiri
Line of Control had “not succeeded” and the U.S. was “disappointed and
frustrated with that reality.”
04/16/03 — India’s Deputy Army Chief said that the number of counter-insurgency
battalions stationed in Kashmir would be increased from 53 to 66 by 2006.
04/14/03 — Police in India’s western Rajasthan state arrested more than 600 Hindu-
nationalist agitators for violating a new state-wide ban on trishuls — a
trident-like dagger associated with the Hindu god Shiva.  Among those
charged with sedition is VHP leader and top Hindu nationalist figure Pravin
Togadia.
04/10/03 — A CIA report claimed that unnamed Indian entities provided “critical”
support to Libya’s ballistic missile program during the first half of 2002.  It
also stated that India has “continued efforts intended to lead to the
development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons.”
04/08/03 — An Indian government report stated that the numbers of both security
personnel and “terrorists” killed in Kashmir declined by about 15% in 2002.
03/03 — Apparent Muslim extremists shot and killed 24 Hindu villagers in Indian
Kashmir.  New Delhi accused Pakistan of “cold-blooded murder.” 
02/03 — The incumbent BJP suffered an upset loss to the Congress Party in state
elections in the overwhelmingly Hindu northern state of Himachal Pradesh.
01/03 — India and Iran launched a “strategic partnership” with the signing of the New
Delhi Declaration and seven other substantive agreements.  Also in January,
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India announced that it has set up a nuclear weapons command system — the
Nuclear Command Authority — headed by the prime minister, and conducted
three ballistic missile tests over an 11-day period.
12/02 — Elections in the state of Gujarat, the site of massive communal violence
earlier in 2002, resulted in an unexpectedly decisive victory for the
incumbent Hindu-nationalist BJP party and a major defeat for the more
secular Congress Party. 
11/02 — During a meeting in New Delhi of the U.S.-India Security Cooperation
Group, top U.S. defense officials discussed the sale of U.S. arms to India.  
10/02 — New Delhi announced a major redeployment of troops away from the India-
Pakistan border, apparently signaling an end to a tense 10-month-long
military face-off with Pakistan. 
09-10/02 — State elections in India’s Jammu and Kashmir resulted in the ousting of the
long-ruling National Conference and the seating of a new government ruled
by a coalition that vows to “soften” the policy toward separatist militants.  In
boycotting the election, the Kashmiri separatist Hurriyat Conference —
which has political ties to Islamabad — found itself marginalized.  The
state’s new coalition government initiated a “common minimum program”
that contains controversial policies, including the release of jailed political
prisoners.  
09/02 — Gunmen stormed a Hindu temple in Gujarat and killed 23 worshipers.  The
attackers were suspected to be Islamic militants seeking revenge for February
2002 anti-Muslim rioting in the state. 
06/02 — Intense international diplomatic pressure — including multiple visits to the
region by senior U.S. government officials — apparently was sufficient to
persuade New Delhi to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan.
Key to the effort were explicit promises by Pakistani President Musharraf to
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that all infiltration of militants
across the Line of Control and into Indian-held Kashmir will be halted. 
05/02 — A terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir killed 34,
mostly women and children.  New Delhi blamed the attack on the “cross-
border terrorism” of Pakistan-sponsored Islamic militants and vowed to fight
a “decisive war” against Pakistan. 
02/02 — After Muslims reportedly set fire to a train carrying Hindu activists, killing
58, India’s worst communal rioting in more than a decade spread across the
Gujarat state over a period of two weeks and resulted in the deaths of more
than 2,000, mostly Muslims, at the hands of vengeful Hindu mobs.  Human
rights groups accuse top state political leaders of abetting the violence.
12/01 — A terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi left 14
people dead.  India blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militants
and began a massive military mobilization along the Pakistan-India frontier.
By the spring of 2002 some one million heavily-armed troops faced-off at the
shared border.  Also in December, the United States designated two Pakistan-
based militant groups — Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed — as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations under U.S. law.
10/01 — A terrorist attack on the assembly building in India’s Jammu and Kashmir
state killed 34 people.  New Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed
separatist militants and the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister called for an
Indian military assault on training camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir.
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09/01 — After major terrorist attacks on the United States, India offered its full
support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region.  Within two months,
all remaining proliferation-related restrictions on U.S. aid to India were lifted.
